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The Effects of CEO’s Divorce on Firm’s Performance: 




To empirically examine the effects of CEOs’ private lives on firms’ performance, I use 
CEOs’ divorce events as a proxy and collect all CEO divorce cases in the U.S. market from 1980 
to 2013. I predict that divorce stress negatively affects CEOs’ ability to make benign strategic 
decisions, thereby negatively influencing firms’ performance. I find that divorced firms have worse 
performance than their counterparties before divorce events end and such events motivate CEOs 
to re-devote themselves to their job post-divorce. The boards of shareholders also use equity-based 
compensation as a valuable method to incentivize divorced CEOs due to their substantial loss of 
outside wealth. Furthermore, divorced CEOs reduce their risk tolerance and become more risk 
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In this study, I test the relationship between CEOs’ divorces and corporate performance in 
the U.S. Prior studies have focused on a wide variety of topics related to CEOs’ work lives, such 
as CEOs’ power, compensation, and work relationships, to name a few. However, it is noteworthy 
that researchers have artificially separated CEOs’ work and private lives. Their private lives have 
been left explained by the press.  
Divorce which is an extreme life transition has negative effects on an individual’s private 
life: such as the loss of emotional support and the lower level of wealth. When an individual has 
encountered a divorce, this will distract him and take a considerable part of attention. Existing 
evidence shows that divorce can lead to a huge loss of individuals’ wealth in divorce settlements, 
especially for the rich. For example, Harold Hamm paid nearly $1 billion to his ex-wife Sue Ann 
Hamm, which made this bitter divorce one of the most expensive divorce cases in history.  
It is clear that prior studies have devoted little attention to CEOs’ divorces and their impact 
on corporate performance. As a human being, CEO also need to balance his or her private life and 
work life. When a CEO suffers divorce, he or she will face the same trouble like other people. 
However, besides a dejected husband or wife, CEO who is the chief decision maker also plays a 
very important role in the workplace. Divorced CEOs might be forced to transfer or sell their stocks 
or options to pay for such large “bills”, which may result in the firms’ loss of control and shape the 
corporate governance in the future. This significant shock to CEOs may have influence on firms in 
at least three ways. First, this negative private event can reduce a CEO’s influence or control of 
his/her firm due to his/her loss of wealth and transfer of stocks in the divorce settlement. Moreover, 
the CEO’s attitude toward risk changes. Second, when a CEO suffers such a painful experience, 
his or her productivity and concentration on the work is certainly affected. Third, the CEO’s 
incentives are also influenced by the divorce event. Prior evidence indicates that shareholders often 
react positively to adjust the CEO’s compensation. Our study fills in the gap of the existing 
literature on the effects of CEOs’ private lives, which extends the branches of behavior finance. 
To validate the aforementioned conjectures, I plan to create a unique database. There are 
no available databases containing all information relevant to divorces. Therefore, I must hand-
collect data and merge them among several databases. 1) I obtain cases of divorced CEOs from 
Factiva and Forbes. 2) I use the Westlaw and Lexis Nexis databases to find court files with the 
exact divorce dates 3) I locate each individual’s work information through Bloomberg and Google 
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and determine whether their divorces happen during their CEO tenures. 4) For the qualified cases, 
I search the companies’ information, such as financial data and stock returns through Compustat, 
CRSP and Execucomp. 5) I match each case using the propensity score matching (PSM) method 
based on the firm’s performance and characteristics. The propensity score matching method 
estimates the impact of the treatment by providing a propensity score based on the firm’s observed 
characteristics, which can taper off the selection bias by equating treatment and control groups 
based on observed covariates. Difference-in-difference (DID) estimations test the effect of a 
treatment on the outcome (dependent variable) by comparing the average change over time 
between the two groups, reducing the selection bias and extraneous factors’ effects. In this study, 
I use the one-to-one nearest-neighbor matching method, similar to Hellman et al. (2008), and 
univariate and multivariate DID estimation. 
I find that divorced CEOs experience challenges from the time when they file their divorce 
documents to when they receive the final court judgment. Such a shock to their private lives 
prevents them from becoming immersed in their job and has a negative impact on their firms’ 
performance. After their divorce cases end, the CEOs can fully focus on their work and they are 
apt to perform better to make up for the loss from the divorce event. Therefore, such firms have 
better performance in the following three years after CEOs’ divorces.  
To test the relationship between a CEO’s divorce and compensation changes, I employ 
similar steps in univariate and multivariate DID estimation for a CEO’s salary, bonus, stock grants 
and option grants based on the Black-Scholes value. I match sample firms and non-divorced firms 
with PSM using a compensation package and a list of firm-level characteristics. The regression 
results show that there is no abnormal compensation in the year before a divorce and in the divorce 
year. The stock grants are significantly higher one year and two years after a divorce, supporting 
our hypothesis that the boards of shareholders take equity-based compensation as a valuable 
method to incentivize divorced CEOs. Restricted stock grants in particular enjoy much more 
popularity among the boards as a valuable indemnifying measure for CEOs who have experienced 
a loss of wealth. 
Previous research demonstrates considerable evidence on CEOs’ risk management. 
Overconfidence, military experience, age, education and political affiliation have been analyzed 
by previous researchers (Malmendier and Tate, 2005; Malmendier and Tate, 2005, 2008; Hutton 
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et al., 2010). However, there is no evidence proving the impact of a CEO’s divorce on risk 
management changes.  
 I demonstrate that divorced CEOs prefer lower firm-level risks in their divorce year and 
remain risk averse for at least two subsequent years. The log stock return volatility and 
idiosyncratic volatility are lower after the divorce year, especially two years post-divorce, which 
is significantly negatively related to stock volatility and idiosyncratic volatility. 
The analysis of CEOs relates to several branches in the behavioral finance literature. As 
noted, previous studies focus invariably on CEOs’ work lives, and academic research has devoted 
little attention to events in their private lives. My study combines the two branches and accentuates 
the effects of a CEO’s divorce experience on his/her firm’s performance. I contribute to the existing 
evidence of CEOs’ individual power. To my knowledge, this study is the first testing the impact of 
a CEO’s divorce on his/her company’s performance using the difference-in-difference estimation 
method. Alternatively, I also showcase the change in CEOs’ risk tolerance after such a painful 
experience and examine the influence of their private wealth on their incentives. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 sheds light on the previous 
related rationales and the three hypotheses. The data selection process, sample description and 
methodologies are highlighted in section 3. Section 4 discusses the primary results of this paper 
and several robustness tests. Section 5 lists limitations to the study. Section 6 presents the key 
findings of the study. 
 
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses 
The study of top executives has drawn considerable attention in the behavior finance press. 
The general consensus is that the CEO, who is the company’s chief decision maker, is ultimately 
responsible for his/her firm’s organization and has a prominent effect on firm performance 
(Finkelstein et al., 2009; Hansen et al., 2010). The analysis of CEOs’ individual characteristics and 
power can be classified into several branches. Evidence shows that top managers’ personalities and 
experiences influence organizational outcomes (Miller and Droge, 1986). It is generally 
acknowledged that firms’ policies and performance are swayed by CEOs’ decisions (Adams, 
Almeida, and Ferreira, 2005). Executives’ decision making plays an important role in developing 
an effective management team, optimizing firms’ performance, and engaging in many other 
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prominent functions. Managers’ traits, such as overconfidence, have been described in prior 
academic research (Malmendier, Tate, and Yan, 2011).  
However, scholars tend to focus on CEO’ personal characteristics rather than delving into 
the relationship between their private lives and daily work. It is a common struggle for managers 
to balance family and work. Simon (1956) argued that decision makers like CEOs are not one-
hundred percent rational. Executives are faced with an influx of information every day (Finkelstein, 
et al., 2009). Such high demands often divert top managers from optimal decision making. When 
they are under great pressure in their personal lives, it is not easy for CEOs to devote their full 
effort to their work (Adams et al., 2005). According to a survey done by Lex Fridman1, the divorce 
rate of chief executives is around 9.89%. Based on survey and anecdotal evidence, managers’ 
wealth lost in a divorce event could range from 25 percent to 50 percent. In a nutshell, the cost of 
a divorce for chief executives is not only the loss of affection, but also the loss of substantial wealth, 
which is a double blow. In the light of the findings with respect to the consequences of divorce, 
there is no doubt that stress stemming from a divorce will divert the CEO’s attention and consume 
much of his/her mind, which limits his/her job-related capacity. I thus posit the following 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: Divorce stress negatively affects CEOs’ ability to make benign strategic decisions, 
thereby negatively influencing firms’ performance. 
Agency theory has enjoyed considerable popularity in the past several decades. Due to the 
dilemma of the principle-agent problem, it is not easy for board members to determine an 
appropriate way to compensate CEOs that incentivizes top managers to immerse themselves in 
their work that is also in line with shareholders’ profits (Core and Guay, 1999). The general 
consensus is that companies are apt to use incentive-based bonuses in which CEOs are rewarded 
by related performance bonuses, like stocks and options, in addition to their base salary (Tufano, 
P., 1996; Brick et al., 2006). Academic researchers have discussed a feasible and comprehensive 
framework to help scholars gauge the current state of CEO compensation research. There are three 
determinants of executive compensation: criteria, governance and contingencies (Barkema and 
Gomez-Mejia, 1998). Basically, criteria can be considered, such as firm size, CEO characteristics, 
                                                 
1 Lex Fridman, “Divorce Rates by Profession”, https://www.scribd.com/document/265583476/Divorce-Rates-by-
Profession-Lex-Fridman-Blog, (May 17, 2015). 
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peer compensation and firm performance, to name a few. Governance refers to a firm’s ownership 
structure, remuneration committee, market control and governance (Jensen, 1993). A handful of 
previous papers on executive compensation rest on the first two criteria; however, the press offers 
little guidance in the third one. Contingencies include possible internal and external determinants 
that have impacts on performance, such as a firm’s strategy, industry regulation, national tax 
system and so on (Barkema and Gomez-Mejia, 1998). CEOs’ divorce events can be classified 
according to this situation as divorces of CEOs have impacts on firms. This paper is an attempt to 
fill the void by checking board directors’ reactions to CEO’s significant private life changes and 
ascertains the impact of divorce events on CEOs’ compensation. 
The empirical evidence on shareholders’ reactions to CEOs’ compensation incentives is 
mixed. Dittmann and Maug (2007) found that different wealth does not lead to the same prediction 
results: salary has a negative relationship with CEOs’ wealth, and stock grants should be more 
favored than options grants. From an information asymmetry perspective, numerous researchers 
assume that CEOs hold more information than the boards on the value of investment opportunities, 
which makes it more difficult for boards to evaluate CEOs’ success (Smith and Watts, 1992; 
Yermack, 1994). Therefore, to improve monitoring, firms whose growth opportunities are greater 
should provide more stock-based compensation to managers instead of cash-based compensation. 
Guay (1999) delved into the evidence that shareholders are apt to use options and stocks to manage 
CEOs’ performance, as portfolio sensitivities diverge from normal conditions, which means when 
CEOs’ wealth decreases, the boards award more equity-based compensation. Corporations usually 
face high idiosyncratic risky projects with a positive net present value. Risk-averse CEOs may not 
be willing to undertake such projects. Boards often employ convex payoffs to induce CEOs to take 
risks (Edmans and Gabaix, 2011). Murphy’s (1990a) research ascertains that equity-based 
compensation for managers is conducive to firms’ value maximization. Mehran (1995) provided 
insight into a positive relation between firms’ performance and the percentage of shares held by 
CEOs. In Hall and Murphy’s (2002) study, the loss of top managers’ wealth will increase 
compensation burden to firm. As a divorce event negatively impacts a CEO’s ability and wealth as 
well as a firm’s profits, I posit that shareholders award more equity-based incentives to compensate 
for CEOs’ wealth loss through divorces so that CEOs can concentrate their attention on their work 
and maintain their firms’ optimal performance.  
Hypothesis 2: CEOs’ equity-based compensation increases after their divorce event. 
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The rationale of agency theory is that CEOs are apt to be less risk aggressive than 
shareholders due to their “under-diversified”, which means that managers tend to avoid 
undertaking great risks, while shareholders tend to seek to maximize returns with great risks 
(Yermack, 1995). Thus, the granting of stocks and options becomes the most direct way to solve 
this agency problem by aligning the interests of shareholders and managers (Coles et al., 2006.). 
As the use of equity-based compensation has grown quite rapidly over the past three decades, 
research on the relationship between equity-based compensation, in the form of stocks and options, 
and risk management decisions has gained attention. 
The prior research remains unclear about whether equity-based compensation provides 
CEOs with incentives to take risks or limit risky projects. The evidence is varied, and a theoretical 
method for how the boards adjust CEOs’ incentives remains unknown. Smith and Watts (1992) 
suggested that CEOs will gain from the options’ convex payoffs and thus incentivize them to take 
on risky projects. Smith and Stulz (1985) proved that equity-based compensation is a favorable 
reward for CEOs to encourage optimal risk-taking behavior. The general knowledge is that the 
increase in volatility makes options more valuable (Smith and Watts, 1982). However, a 
burgeoning amount of evidence indicates that it may not be legal for CEOs to sell their stock in 
short-term transactions; they are also forbidden from trading their stock options because they are 
typically allowed to exercise them after a specified time period, which is as least two to three years 
following grants. Gormley, Matsa and Milbourn (2013) argued that although shareholders can react 
quickly to modify executives’ incentives to increase risk, it takes at least three to five years for 
managers to shift the sensitivity of their wealth to firm risk. Thus, the CEOs’ sensitivity of new 
incentive portfolio to firm-level risk is not easy to change quickly. Lambert et al. (1991) found that 
options amplify CEOs’ exposure to firm risks and induce managers to become more risk averse. 
This is due to the market imperfections that diverge the valuation of compensation schemes 
between CEOs and shareholders. Moral hazard and adverse selection make managers have more 
restraints in diversifying risk to a certain extent as shareholders (Jensen, 1993).  
Some researchers have found a negative relationship between CEO incentives and return 
variance (Samwick and Aggarwal, 1999). Prior studies demonstrate that a left-tail event, like 
employment loss or bankruptcy, which can induce huge personal losses, affects managers’ risk-
taking behaviors (Coles, Daniel and Naveen, 2006). Managers limit their financial exposure to firm 
risks due to the loss of private wealth and reputation. CEOs can also change firm risks by modifying 
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corporate investments directly (Gormley and Matsa, 2011). Although the board of shareholders 
increase equity-based compensation to change divorced managers’ portfolios, as managers sell 
unrestricted stocks or exercise options to pay substantial amounts of money following the divorce 
settlement to their spouses, and the new incentives cannot be exercised in the short term, divorced 
CEOs’ exposure to firm risk is limited, and they are more risk averse and reduce their risk tolerance. 
Hypothesis 3: Divorced CEOs will be more risk averse and firms will show lower stock return 
volatility in the year following divorce. 
 
3. Data Source and Description 
3.1. Data source 
The information on CEOs’ divorces is hand-collected from myriad datasets and websites. I 
employ the name list with 3444 CEOs from Execucomp (1960–2014) and type keywords like 
“divorce”, “ex-wife” and “remarried” to search for the related divorce news on the Factiva database. 
I also use the Forbes 400 richest Americans lists, which contains the marital status for the top 
wealthiest men/women in America during 1997–2013. I collect the richest divorce cases on the 
Forbes 400 lists and double check to ensure they are CEOs and the divorces happened during their 
tenures. The third method of data collection I use is SEC filings. For some CEOs who are divorced 
from their wives, they must file form 4 on Edgar to showcase the transaction of stocks and options. 
The files provide the names of the executives and the firms. However, Edgar provides data dating 
back only about 5 years prior to 2016; the filing dates are the dates that the transactions happened, 
but not the exact divorce dates. Nevertheless, this database still underpins the sources for cross-
checked divorce events. 
The main concern is that the precise divorce dates are not easy to find. One reason is that it 
is illegal to publicize divorce information in some American states and counties. For other cases, 
that lack available information is due to technological limitations—there are no electronic records 
for divorce cases dating many years back. Moreover, some celebrities use assumed names in court 
records, which becomes another problem that hinders the collection process.   
To obtain accurate information on the divorce dates, I search the Westlaw US database, 
LexisNexis database and several public websites, like Vitalchek.com, which provide divorce filing 
information with exact file dates or court judgment dates. In addition to records databases, some 
state governments also supply online sources for the public to check court documents. Texas’ 
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official website offers downloadable files for all counties of the state, which contain related 
information on the divorced parties, such as the parties’ names and ages, the date of the court filing, 
the history of the marriage and the related judicial decision.  
For CEOs who do not have public court files for their divorces, I match their divorce events 
in accordance with names and other pertaining information. Due to the common name repetition 
and lack of a unique identifier, I match CEOs’ names with their birthday, spouse’s name, company 
occupation and their location and the firm’s headquarter location. Then, I use several biographical 
websites like Ancestry.com, marriage-divorce-records.mooseroots.com to find the divorce dates. 
Finally, I gather 131 CEOs with 147 divorce cases (as some have been divorced more than 
once or during their divorce they acted as a CEO in more than one company). However, there are 
64 CEOs (67 cases) who have positions in private firms. I fail to find such private data through 
Compustat. The exact divorce year for 29 of the cases cannot be found through each database nor 
online websites. I have to drop them due to missing information. For the other cases, there are 7 
firms for which financial data are not available during the divorce period due to being delisted, or 
a merger and acquisition. I drop firms with missing data for the period starting from the three years 
before the divorce year(t-3) to three years after the divorce year (t+3). Overall, I collect a sample 
group of 44 divorced CEOs with available fundamental data. For the financial information on the 
sample group and stock related data, I collect the data from Compustat and CRSP. For information 
on CEOs’ compensation, I download the panel data from Execucomp and use Datastream as the 
supplement. 
 
3.2. Data description 
Table 1 showcases the distribution of divorce cases by year and the two-digit SIC industry. 
Panel A reports the year distribution. I collect divorce cases from 1980 to 2013. I exclude cases 
that happened in 2014 because of the lack information for year 2016. In Panel A, the summary 
displays the fact that the divorce rate increases from 2009 to 2012, during which nearly 50% of the 
total number of divorces happened. Panel B shows the industry distribution for all 44 divorced 
firms. I use the two-digit SIC industry rather than Fama-French 48 industry, as the latter one cannot 
obtain a matched sample using the propensity score matching method. From Panel B, we can see 
that divorces that happened in the oil & gas extraction, transportation equipment, communications, 
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holding & other investment offices and business services industries represented half of the total 
cases. 
Panel C showcases the summary statistics for both divorced firms and non-divorced firms. 
The observations return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE), log assets, leverage ratio and 
market capitalization (MC) are 604, while there are 596 observations for the market-to-book ratio 
(MTB) due to missing data. I winsorize all non-dummy variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles.  
 
Table 1 Summary of divorce cases 
This table shows the number of CEO divorces from period 1980-2013. Divorced firms are listed by two-
digits SIC industry. 
 
Panel A The number of divorce cases by year 
 



































01 Agricultural Production - Crops 1 
13 Oil & Gas Extraction 4 
20 Food & Kindred Products 1 
28 Chemical & Allied Products 2 
35 Industrial Machinery & Equipment 1 
36 Electronic & Other Electric Equipment 1 
37 Transportation Equipment 4 
38 Instruments & Related Products 3 
39 Miscellaneous Manufacturing Industries 1 
45 Transportation by Air 1 
48 Communications 4 
49 Electric, Gas, & Sanitary Services 1 
57  Furniture & Homefurnishings Stores 1 
58 Eating & Drinking Places 2 
60 Depository Institutions 1 
61 Nondepository Institutions 3 
63 Insurance Carriers 1 
67 Holding & Other Investment Offices 4 
73 Business Services 5 
79 Amusement & Recreation Services 1 
99 Non-Classifiable Establishments 2 
Total  44 
 
Panel C Summary of Firm Characteristic 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Log assets 604 3.58 1.18 -0.70 5.88 
ROA 604 -0.01 0.29 -4.61 0.34 
ROE 604 0.01 0.72 -5.72 4.95 
Leverage ratio 604 0.44 0.38 0 4.77 
MC 604 16401.18 48449.61 0 476115.5 





4. Methodology and Results 
4.1 CEO divorce and firm performance 
To gauge the long-term value effects for public firms after the announcement of CEOs’ 
divorces, I employ a DID estimation based on the comparison companies identified using the PSM 
method. The PSM method estimates the impact of the treatment by providing a propensity score 
based on a firm’s observed characteristics. This statistical matching method attempts to taper off 
the selection bias by equating treatment and control groups based on observed covariates. DID 
estimations test the effects of a treatment on the outcome (dependent variable) by doing the 
comparison between treatment and control groups, which reduce the selection bias and extraneous 
factors’ effects. In this study, I use the one-to-one nearest-neighbor matching method, similar to 
Hellman et al. (2008), and univariate and multivariate DID estimation. Divorce is viewed as the 
treatment, and the divorce year is the event year shown as 𝑡0. I match firms from the whole sample 
pool of the Compustat database based on the two-digit SIC code, year, firm size (I use both log 
total assets and MC), firm growth opportunity (which is MTB) and leverage ratio, ROA and ROE. 
I employ the year 𝑡0-3 as the matching year because there are an average of two or three years for 
the divorce cases from filing the divorce document to the final court judgment. Because usually 
the couple has divergences and contradictions on the division of property and it takes time to make 
judgements by the court. I use year 𝑡0-2 to try to do the multivariate DID estimation, but the results 
are not significant and thus not reported here.  To determine the quality of the matching results, I 
employ univariate tests and probit regressions on the unbalanced whole sample pool (labeled as 
“Prematch”) and PSM-matched pairs that combined divorced and non-divorced firms obtained 
from PSM (labeled as “Postmatch). The balance tests’ results shown in Table 2 suggest that all the 
coefficients of independent variables in the post-match estimation are insignificant, which means 
we cannot reject the null hypotheses that there is no difference between the mean of the treatment 
group and that of the matched group in firm characteristics. The univariate comparisons highlight 
that the divorced firms and non-divorced firms have similar firm characteristics in year 𝑡0-3 and 
the matching results are appropriate. Panel B of Table 2 is the probit regression in which the 
dependent variable equals one if the firm has a divorce case and zero otherwise. The results for 
multivariate test of post match are insignificant which means the impacts of all variables on the 





Table 2: Balancing tests for Propensity Score Matching 
This table showcases the diagnostics of Difference-in-Difference tests on the effects of divorce on firm’s 
performance. We use one-to-one nearest neighbor method for propensity score matching with firm-level 
characteristics matching variables. Panel A presents the balance tests for the treatment firms and control 
group before and after matching. The “Prematch” column reports the estimates of whole sample data prior 
to matching. The “Postmatch” column contains the information of treatment and control groups after 
matching, which treatment groups are firms with divorced cases and control groups are the non-divorced 
firms matched form propensity score matching. Panel B shows the parameter estimates of multivariate 
probit models using in propensity score matching. The standard errors in parentheses are reported at 
1%(***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Univariate tests 
  Prematch   Postmatch  
         Divorced 
   Non-
divorced Diff       Divorced 
Non-
divorced Diff 
 Mean Mean       Mean   Mean  
ROA      0.00 -1.11 -0.11 -0.03 0.01 0.03 
ROE    0.04 0.01 -0.03 -0.06    0.01 -0.07 
Log assets    3.63 2.10 -1.53*** 3.57 3.37 -0.20 
Leverage ratio    0.47 0.41 0.06 0.39 0.51 0.12 
MC 19725.56 1504.58 -18220.99*** 21728.98 7797.67 -13931.31 
MTB    2.87 1.90 -0.97 2.13 1.73 -0.40 
N         384,480        88  
 
Panel B: Multivariate tests 
 Dependent Variable: Divorce 
  Prematch   Postmatch  
 Coeff S.E P-Value Coeff S.E P-Value 
ROA -0.57 0.09 0.53 -1.03 0.92 0.26 
ROE -0.02 0.02 0.27 0.02 0.23 0.95 
Log assets 0.33*** 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.15 0.80 
Leverage ratio        0.10  0.09 0.28 -0.34 0.30 0.25 
MC 9.77e-07 6.16e-07 0.11 4.46e-06 3.85e-06 0.25 
MTB 0.15* 0.01 0.07 0.01 0.05 0.82 
Constant -4.77*** 0.21 0.00 0.14 0.70 0.84 
Industry FE Yes   Yes   
Year FE Yes   Yes   





To complement the multivariate DID estimation based on the firms’ performance, I conduct 
two panel regressions to examine the pre-divorce and post-divorce periods as follows: 
       𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖 × 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝑏 ∗ 𝑋𝑖𝑡 + ℇ𝑖𝑡  
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝑏 ∗ 𝑋𝑖𝑡 + ℇ𝑖𝑡 
  Where 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡  represents the return on assets for each firm from the divorce group and 
matched group at time t. 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖 is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm has a 
divorce case and zero if not. 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 is a dummy variable equal to one for years t-3, t-2, t-1 
and zero otherwise.  𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 is a dummy variable equal to one for years t+1, t+2, t+3 and 
zero if not.  𝑋𝑖𝑡 represents a vector of control variables based on the firm level, such as firm size 
(log assets and market capitalization), MTB, leverage ratio, industry and year. I use six-year data 
around the divorce year, three years before and three years after, and seven years in total for each 
firm. The year fixed effect and the industry fixed effect are under consideration to exclude the 
unobservable fact that could be correlated to the divorce event and be turbulent to the results. In 
accordance with the previous research and rationale, I posit that the divorced firms will show worse 
performance than matched firms before the divorce year and the DID coefficients 𝛽2  will be 
positive after a divorce, as divorced CEOs have totally released from the divorce and can re-devote 
every effort to work. 
Table 3 illuminates the aforementioned hypothesis. Panel A sheds light on the divorce 
impact on firms’ performance for years before divorce. The coefficient of the interaction term 
𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖 × 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 is negative and statistically significant, which is congruent with 
our deduction that divorced CEOs are thrown into trouble during the period starting  from when 
they file divorce documents to when they receive the final court judgment, and such private life 
prevents them from being fully immersed in their job. The dummy variable 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖  is 
highly significant at the 5% level, which means that firms’ performance is impacted by divorce 
events. Panel B of Table 3 suggests that the coefficient of interaction term 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖 ×
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 is positive and statistically significant, consistent with our hypothesis that after  
divorce cases end, the CEOs can fully focus on their work and they are apt to perform better to 
make up for the loss from the divorce event. In both regressions, the log assets, market-to-book 
ratio and leverage ratio also have a strong influence on ROA. The correlation coefficients are 
statistically significant at the 99% level. 
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Table 3 CEO Divorce and Firm Performance 
Table 3 illuminates two panel regressions to examine impacts of divorce event during pre divorce period 
and post divorce period. Where ROA represents the return on assets for each firm from divorce group and 
matched group at time t. 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒 is a dummy variable which equals to one if the firm has divorce case and 
zero if not. 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒 is a dummy variable equals to one for years t-3, t-2, t-1 and zero otherwise.  
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒 is a dummy variable equals to one for years t+1, t+2, t+3 and zero otherwise. Control variables 
are based on firm level, such as firm size (log assets and MC), MTB, leverage ratio, industry and year. We 
use six-years data around the divorce year which three years before and three years afterward and seven 
years in total for each firm. Year fixed effect and industry fixed effect are under consideration to exclude 
the unobservable fact that could be correlated to the divorce event and turbulent to the results. Standard 
errors are in parentheses, which *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the .10, .05, and .01 levels, 
respectively. 
 
Panel A- CEO Divorce and Firm Performance before Divorce Year 
 
Variables ROA ROA ROA ROA ROA ROA 
Divorce 0.05*  0.07**    0.04    0.04    0.06**   0.06** 
  (1.85) (2.35) (1.29) (1.59) (1.98) (2.49) 
Divorce*PreDivorce  -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.06** 
   (-1.45) (-1.13) (-1.22) (-1.41) (-1.98) 
Log assets   0.10*** 0.11*** 0.10*** 0.04*** 
    (9.32) (9.67) (8.78) (9.71) 
MC    -7.2e-07*** -6.4e-07**  -2.95e-07 
     (-2.70) (-2.35) (-1.18) 
MTB     -0.01** -0.01*** 
      (-2.19) (-4.91) 
Leverage ratio      -0.34*** 
       (-10.73) 
Constant -0.03**  -0.03**    -0.36***   -0.40***    -0.37***   0.00 
  (-1.98) (-1.98) (-9.37) (-9.79) (-8.36) (0.02) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 604 604 604 604 596 596 





Panel B- CEO Divorce and Firm Performance after Divorce Year 
 
Variables ROA ROA ROA ROA ROA ROA 
Divorce 0.05* 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01 
 (1.85) (0.83) (0.13) (0.35) (0.56) (0.49) 
Divorce*Postdivorce  0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.06* 
  (1.32) (1.00) (1.05) (1.22) (1.71) 
Log assets   0.10*** 0.11*** 0.10*** 0.04*** 
   (9.33) (9.67) (8.78) (3.69) 
MTB    -7.16e-07*** -6.35e-7** -2.90e-7 
    (-2.68) (-2.33) (-1.16) 
MC     -0.01** -0.01*** 
     (-2.17) (-4.88) 
Leverage ratio      -0.34*** 
      (-10.70) 
Constant -0.03** -0.03** -0.36*** -0.40***   -0.37*** -0.00 
 (-1.98) (-1.98) (-9.37) (-9.79) (-8.36) (-0.00) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 604 604 604 604 596 596 
R-squared 0.03 0.04 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.33 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Overall, the results of both univariate and multivariate estimations underpin that divorced 
firms have worse performance than their counterparts before divorce events end and such events 
motivate CEOs to re-devote themselves to their job after their divorces have been settled.  
 
4.2 CEO divorce and compensation 
To test the relationship between CEOs’ divorces and their compensation changes, I employ 
similar steps to the univariate and multivariate DID estimation for CEOs’ salary, stock grants and 
option grants based on the Black-Scholes value. Because Execucomp only contains the 
compensation data from 1992 and some of the firms’ information are missing, I only obtain 
information on 22 divorced CEOs’ compensation. I use nearest-neighbor propensity score 
matching to match divorced CEOs and non-divorced CEOs based on their compensation packages, 
containing their salary, bonuses, stock grants and option grants, and a list of firm-level 
characteristics, such as the two-digit SIC industry, year, log assets, ROA and leverage ratio. The 
matching year is one year before the divorce year to ensure the treatment group and the control 
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group are at the same level before the divorce court judgment happens. Thus, I can verify whether 
this huge private life change has an influence on CEOs’ compensation. Because I use the court 
judgment date as the divorce date, not the announcement dates or filing divorce documents dates, 
which happened earlier, it is not surprising that wealth shock may affect compensation during the 
divorce year. However, as the judgment files proclaim the final disposition of property, I expect 
that compensation changes should be significant one year after the divorce year. According to 
Boschen and Smith (1995), there are average 5 years following changes that encompass the 
important performance event on CEO’s compensation. Thus, I also test the incentive variations two 
years after the divorce year.  
As the previous paper researched (Finkelstein and Boyd, 1998), the factors influencing 
compensation can be classified into four parts: the CEO’s personal characteristics, firm size factors, 
firm performance and discretion. I run the OLS regressions on cash compensation and equity 
compensation separately.  
 
 Salaryit = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ Divorcei + 𝛽2 ∗ 1ybeforei + 𝛽3 ∗ Divorceyeari + 𝛽4 ∗ 1yafteri + 𝛽5
∗ 2yafteri + 𝛽6 ∗ Ageit + 𝛽7 ∗ Tenureit + 𝛽8 ∗ Laglogassetsit + 𝛽9 ∗ LagROAit
+ 𝛽10 ∗ LagROEit + 𝛽11 ∗ LagMTBit + 𝛽12 ∗ Lagleverageratioit + ℇit 
 Bonusit = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ Divorcei + 𝛽2 ∗ 1ybeforei + 𝛽3 ∗ Divorceyeari + 𝛽4 ∗ 1yafteri + 𝛽5
∗ 2yafteri + 𝛽6 ∗ Ageit + 𝛽7 ∗ Tenureit + 𝛽8 ∗ Laglogassetsit + 𝛽9 ∗ LagROAit
+ 𝛽10 ∗ LagROEit + 𝛽11 ∗ LagMTBit + 𝛽12 ∗ Lagleverageratioit + ℇit 
 Stockit = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ Divorcei + 𝛽2 ∗ 1ybeforei + 𝛽3 ∗ Divorceyeari + 𝛽4 ∗ 1yafteri + 𝛽5
∗ 2yafteri + 𝛽6 ∗ Ageit + 𝛽7 ∗ Tenureit + 𝛽8 ∗ Laglogassetsit + 𝛽9 ∗ LagROAit
+ 𝛽10 ∗ LagROEit + 𝛽11 ∗ LagMTBit + 𝛽12 ∗ Lagleverageratioit + ℇit 
 Optionit = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ Divorcei + 𝛽2 ∗ 1ybeforei + 𝛽3 ∗ Divorceyeari + 𝛽4 ∗ 1yafteri + 𝛽5
∗ 2yafteri + 𝛽6 ∗ Ageit + 𝛽7 ∗ Tenureit + 𝛽8 ∗ Laglogassetsit + 𝛽9 ∗ LagROAit
+ 𝛽10 ∗ LagROEit + 𝛽11 ∗ LagMTBit + 𝛽12 ∗ Lagleverageratioit + ℇit 
 
The four dependent variables are salary, bonus, stock grants and option grants. Stock grants 
are the annual restricted stock grants paid to CEOs, and option grants are the Black-Scholes values 
of options that managers gain. The compensation data are reported in thousands. All the 
compensation information can be obtained directly from Execucomp. The firm-level variables are 
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one-year lag variables to reduce potential endogeneity (Brick, Palmon and Wald, 2005). Generally, 
shareholders determine CEOs’ incentives based on the previous year’s firm characteristics and 
performance (Neyland, 2012). Those control variables are taken from Compustat. I also included 
CEOs’ age and tenure in the regression based on the usual compensation research (Yermack, 1994). 
Table 4 illustrates the compensation summary of divorced CEOs and non-divorced CEOs and the 
differences between the divorced and non-divorced groups. 
Panel A reports the summary of compensation variables and control variables. The mean  
salary is $1041,362 and the mean bonus is $959,271. Stock grants and option grants have a similar 
mean, around $3300,000. For personal characteristics, CEOs in our whole sample are around 55 
years old, and the average tenure is 8 years. Panel B showcases the differences in the mean and 
median between the sample and matched groups. Because the sample size is small, I use both t- 
and Wilcoxon signed-rank tests. The Wilcoxon signed-rank test is an alternative to a paired t-test 
when the assumptions of the t-test are not met. This nonparametric method is more powerful than 
a t-test for a small sample size (Klotz, 1963). For the pre-divorce year, we can see that all the 
coefficients of variables are statistically insignificant under both t- and signed rank z-tests, which 
means that there are no differences between the treatment group and the matched group. This 
proves that our matching results go well for all the divorce cases. In terms of one year post-divorce, 
all the compensation variables for the sample group are larger than the matched group. The mean 
of stock grants for divorced firms is $6885,610 higher than non-divorced firms. The option grants 
value for divorced firms is $1729,780 higher than the matched group. In particular, for the salary 
and stock grants and other compensation, the coefficients of these three variables are statistically 
significant under both the t- and z-tests. The option grant value is not significant at the 95% level. 
Divorced CEOs’ owner shares of stock reduce post-divorce. The initial comparisons are consistent 
with our hypothesis that boards increase incentives for divorced CEOs and the stock grants are 
much more preferred as the incentive method. For the ownership variables and firm-level control 
variables, there are no obvious differences between the treatment and matched groups under the 
univariate tests. 
Table 5 reports the multivariate regression for examining the impact of CEOs’ divorces on 
their compensation. The independent variable divorce is the dummy variable that equals one if the 
firm has divorce cases and zero if not. The following four variables are also binary, which is one 
when the year is one year before the divorce, during the divorce year and one or two years post-
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divorce. I also include the CEOs’ age and tenure into the regression. The results indicate that the 
divorce event has a prominent impact on CEOs’ salary and bonus. The coefficients of divorce in 
both salary regression and bonus regression are quite significant. There is no abnormal 
compensation before the divorce year and during the divorce year. The stock grants are 
significantly higher one and two years post-divorce, supporting our hypothesis that the boards of 
shareholders take equity-based compensation as a valuable method to incentivize divorced CEOs. 
CEOs’ age also has significant negative relationship with equity-based compensation and a positive 
relationship with bonus. In terms of tenure, CEOs who work longer have a lower percentage of 
cash-based compensation and a higher amount of stock grants and option grants. The larger the 
firm, the larger the compensation for both cash- and equity-based compensation.  
 
Table 4 CEO divorce and compensation 
This table showcases the summary of characteristics for firm and CEO in panel A and difference of mean 
and median between divorced group and matched group in panel B. Salary and bonus are the cash 
compensation paid to CEO annually. Stock grants is the annual restricted stock grants paid to CEOs and 
option grants is the Black-Scholes values of options that managers gain. The compensation data are reported 
in thousands. All the compensation can be obtained directly from Execucomp. The firm level variables are 
one-year lag variables. Those control variables are taken form Compustat. 
 
Panel A Summary of Firm and CEO Characteristics 
Variable  Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Salary 339 1041.36     809.86           0 5806.65 
Bonus 339 959.27 2367.40           0 16500 
Stock grants 339 3341.86     8990.53           0 94555.28 
Option grants 339 3259.94     11232.66           0 90693.40 
Age 339 55.38     10.14          35 87 
Tenure 339 8.66     8.11          1 48 
Lag log assets 338 3.78      0.76    1.71    5.16 
Lag ROA 338 0.04    0.08   -0.67    0.34 
Lag ROE 338 0.12 0.56 -5.72   4.95 
Lag MTB 338 2.76     7.09   -106.52    20.22 








Panel B Differences between two groups 
 













Compensation variable          
Salary 808.53 935.03 -1.11 -0.94  1027.52 808.53 1.94 2.46 
Bonus 930.36 737.84 0.74 0.60  1717.84 944.89 1.04 0.82 
Stock grants value  1446.27   2256.50 -0.97 -0.41  7852.94 976.33 2.05 3.93 
Option grants value  5865.39   2027.96 0.71 0.28  4929.09   3199.31 1.29 1.52 
Other compensation 252.59 251.93 0.01 0.09   915.29 252.59 1.37 2.71 
Ownership variable          
Shares owned 1162.67    1673.30 -1.01 -0.35  993.75    1585.30 -1.01 -0.88 
Unexercisable option number 2190.47 569.17 1.29 1.25   1832.15   1746.42 0.36 0.59 
Unexercisable option value 5924.86   1915.71 0.75 0.47   3177.77   2190.47 1.23 1.53 
Exercisable option number 787.71 301.69 0.98 0.34  693.23 787.71 -2.08 -2.42 
Exercisable option value 1171.15   4119.65 -1.25 -0.31   2571.05   1243.15 0.64 0.03 
Restricted stock number 110.88 110.36 0.01 0.46  119.92 110.88 0.33 0.49 
Restricted stock value 4381.24   3556.85 0.28 0.74   5577.43   4381.24 1.29 1.19 
Control variable          
Lag log assets 3.51 3.65 -1.14 -1.41  3.58 3.56 0.16 0.99 
Lag MTB 1.98 2.98 -1.98 -1.26  3.25 2.79 0.57 0.05 
Lag ROA 0.01 0.02 -0.37 -1.13  0.04 0.03 0.59 0.05 
Lag ROE 0.03 0.12 -0.88 -1.75  0.11 0.09 0.20 0.73 
Lag leverage ratio 0.42 0.41 0.25 0.15  0.38 0.39 -0.36 -0.02 





Table 5 Multivariate Regression for CEO Compensation 
This table reports the results of OLS regression of CEO compensation. The dependent variables are CEO’s 
salary, bonus, stock awards and option awards separately. For the main independent variables, the divorce 
is the dummy variables which equals to one if the firm has divorce case or zero if not. The following four 
variables are also dummy which equal to one in the one year before divorce year, the year of divorce, one 
and two-year after divorce case. Salary and Bonus which get from Execucomp are the cash compensation 
paid to CEO.   
   
 Salary Bonus Stock grants Option grants 
Divorce 195.2**  957.5*** 1076.30 550.20 
 (2.35 ) (3.80) (0.95) (0.41) 
1y before  -124.5  -234.1 -642.6  921.2 
 (-1.14) (-0.71) (-0.43) (0.53) 
Divorce year -70.82 -365.5 1760.0 706.9 
 (-0.65) (-1.10) (1.18) (0.40) 
1y after  30.12 -92.11 3620.9 ** 737.2 
 (0.28) (-0.28) (2.44) (0.42) 
2y after  105.8 -205.3 3469.7 ** 139.3 
 (0.93) (-0.60) (2.26) (0.08) 
Age -1.02 93.04 *** -369.1*** -273.1 *** 
 (-0.17) (5.24) (-4.64) (-2.91) 
Tenure -7.55 -83.18 *** 302.8 *** 652.0 *** 
 (-1.34) (-4.87) (3.95) (7.22) 
Lag log assets 349.8 *** 954.3 *** 2233.7 ** 2635.7 ** 
 (5.16) (4.65) (2.43) (2.43) 
Lag ROA - 737.2 -2988.7** 6652.4 12667.5* 
 (-1.57) (-2.10) (1.04) (1.69) 
Lag MTB -1.90 -7.72 -16.88 85.33 
 (-0.37) (-0.50) (-0.24) (1.04) 
Lag leverage ratio -617.8*** -2258.4*** -1785.9 -2351.3 
 (-2.71) (-3.27) (-0.58) (-0.65) 
Constant  61.37  -6271.4*** 11788.1** 2440.4 
 (0.16) (-5.55) (2.33) (0.41) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 338 338 338 338 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
In sum, the univariate and multivariate tests on compensation both provide evidence that 
although cash compensation may be a method to diversify divorced CEOs’ incentive packages, 
equity-based compensation, especially restricted stock grants, is much more popular among the 





4.3 CEO divorce and corporate risk  
I also aim to gauge the effects of divorce events on firms’ equity risk. CEOs who are less 
diversified because of divorce and wealth loss are apt to be more risk averse and tend to reduce 
firm-level risk. The matched sample is still the sample group in 4.1. However, the permno of some 
divorced firms and non-divorced firms cannot be found in CRSP, which means the stock-related 
information is not available for those firms. After excluding those pairs, I finally get 25 pairs that 
have complete data for both sample and matched firms. In this part, I include all the years’ 
information with the stock return volatility and idiosyncratic volatility in the regression. I use two 
methods to measure the firm risk. The idiosyncratic risk is the shock or impact caused at the firm 
level, which has little correlation with market risk. It is calculated by the standard deviation of 
residuals counted from the four-factor Carhart model (1997). The data are the monthly returns to 
avoid microstructure noise. The return data are at least six months for each firm year. 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡 = ?̂?𝑖+ 𝛽1,iRmt+ 𝛽2,𝑖SMBt+ 𝛽3,𝑖HMLt + 𝛽4,𝑖UMDt+ℇ𝑖 
Where 𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the stock return for firm 𝑖 at time 𝑡 and 𝑅𝑚𝑡 is the return of the value-weighted 
market index. 𝑅𝑓𝑡 is the risk-free rate in the market. In the regression, ?̂?𝑖 is the estimate of the 
constant and 𝛽 is the slope, where 𝛽1,𝑖 is the coefficient for the return of the value-weighted index, 
𝛽2,𝑖 and 𝛽3,𝑖 represents the coefficients of Fama-French’s “Small-Minus-Big” and “High-Minus-
Low” factors, and 𝛽4,𝑖 denotes the Momentum factor form Carhart’s four-factor regression model. 
𝑅𝑚𝑡, 𝑅𝑓𝑡, SMB, HML and UMD are obtained from CRSP. For the Carhart four-factor model, I 
directly downloaded the information from the risk-free rate, value-weighted market index, SMB, 
HML and UMD from CRSP.  
             LogStockVolatilityit = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ Divorcei + 𝛽2 ∗ 1ybeforei + 𝛽3 ∗ Divorceyeari +
                                                        𝛽4 ∗ 1yafteri + 𝛽5 ∗ 2yafteri + 𝛽6 ∗ Logassetsit +
                                                        𝛽7 ∗ Leverageratioit + 𝛽8 ∗ MTBit + 𝛽9 ∗ Cashratioit +
                                                         𝛽10 ∗ DividendsDummyit + ℇit   
IdiosyncraticVolatilityit = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ Divorcei + 𝛽2 ∗ 1ybeforei + 𝛽3 ∗ Divorceyeari +
                                                          𝛽4 ∗ 1yafteri + 𝛽5 ∗ 2yafteri + 𝛽6 ∗ Logassetsit +
                                                         𝛽7 ∗ Leverageratioit + 𝛽8 ∗ MTBit + 𝛽9 ∗ Cashratioit +




I also use the traditional stock volatility proxy for the firm risk, which is the standard 
deviation of the annualized return. For the independent variables, except the divorce dummy, I add 
the four dummy variables mentioned previously to test whether the years before and after the 
divorce year affect the stock volatility. Firm size, measured by the log total assets and the MTB, 
are controlled. I also include the cash ratio (cash divided by total assets) and leverage, which are 
the two major determinants when it comes to leverage effects (Brown and Kapadia, 2005). The 
dividends indicator equals one if the firm paid dividends in that year. The industry fixed effects 
and year fixed effects are controlled.  
Table 6 presents the results of multivariate regressions. Divorce events have a significant 
influence on stock return volatility and idiosyncratic volatility. Firms with CEOs undergoing 
divorces have lower volatility than their non-divorced counterparts. The firm risks are lower in the 
divorce year and one and two years post-divorce. In particular, the coefficient two years post-
divorce is significant at the 95% level for return volatility and 90% for idiosyncratic volatility. 
These results are consistent with our hypothesis that the loss of wealth and less diversification of 
portfolios reduce CEOs’ risk tolerance and make them more risk averse. Log assets also have a 
strong negative relation with two kinds of volatilities and the leverage ratio positively impacts a 
firm’s risk. The cash ratio has a positive significantly effect on the stock returns volatility and 
idiosyncratic volatility because of the reduction in total assets. 
In sum, the results are identical with our third hypothesis that divorce managers are not risk 
aggressive following a divorce event and their risk preference is conservative due to their less-
diversified personal portfolio. This is also consistent with the results indicating lower stock risk 






Table 6 Multivariate Regression for Firm Risk 
This table reports the results of OLS regression of firm risk. The dependent variables are log stock return 
volatility and idiosyncratic volatility separately. For the main independent variables, the divorce is the 
dummy variables which equals to one if the firm has divorce case or zero if not. The following four variables 
are also dummy which equal to one in the one year before divorce year, the year of divorce, one and two-
year after divorce case. Other variables controlled are firm’s leverage ratio, MTB, cash ratio which equals 
to cash divided by total assets. Dividend dummy equals to one if firm pays dividend in the year. Year fixed 
effects and industry fixed effects are included.   
 




Divorce -0.06** -0.01**  
 (-2.02) (-1.97)    
1y before  0.08 0.00   
 (1.40) (0.02)    
Divorce year -0.03 -0.00    
 (-0.55) (-0.16)    
1y after  -0.08 -0.02   
 (-1.51) (-1.17)    
2y after  -0.14** -0.02*   
 (-2.31) (-1.73)    
Log assets -0.15*** -0.04*** 
 (-7.08) (-7.81)    
Leverage ratio 0.31*** 0.09*** 
 (3.76) (4.83)    
MTB 0.00 0.00    
 (1.13) (0.65)    
Cash ratio 1.177*** 0.113*** 
 (7.14) (2.87)    
Dividends dummy -0.09 0.00    
 (-0.92) (0.14)    
Constant 0.86*** 0.36*** 
 (6.78) (11.94)    
Year FE Yes Yes  Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes  Yes 
N 793 793    
Standard errors in parentheses 





One limitation of this study is the rather small sample size. Due to missing of data and 
limited information of court files, many collected cases cannot be analyzed in this study. If more 
information can be obtained, there are some directions for future research. In this study, I only use 
a dummy variable to measure divorce event homogenously. It will be interesting to use a different 
measurement to test divorce effects. In accordance with future theoretical analysis, it will be 
conceivable to divide the divorced CEO in difference groups by considering the number of kids 
and the number of previous divorce. For CEOs who have more kids, their firm performance may 
not become better following the divorce. This may be explained by that without the support of their 
spouse, they need more time to take care of the kids and their private lives. This may take a 
considerable part of their attention so that they cannot fully focus on their work after the divorce. 
Besides, in my sample, there are some CEOs have more than once divorce. If the CEOs have gone 
through divorce before, it is possible that their risk attitudes may not be changed or they will 
become more risk aggressive after the divorce ends. Furthermore, I only use stock return volatility 
and idiosyncratic volatility to measure the risk firm. Cash flow volatility could be another way to 
gauge firm-level risk, which represents the cash flow risk only based on the inside firm 
management. The volatility of firm’s cash flow will present the thoughts of CEOs about their risk 
attitude. The related the predictions and analysis can also be extended to firm risk management and 
CEO compensation utility.  
6. Summary and Conclusions 
It is the common knowledge that CEOs are embedded in both their private and work lives. 
No one can entirely separate his or her work life from his or her private life. As the top executive 
officer, a CEO is usually empowered to make prominent decisions in the light of corporate policies 
and investments. Previous researchers have explored a wide variety of topics, such as CEOs’ 
compensation, age and overconfidence. However, there is little evidence devoted to revisiting the 
relationship between CEOs’ two kinds of lives. Thereby researchers rarely focus on managers’ 
private lives and whether personal factors can influence their firm performance. Therefore, it is 
meaningful to discuss how much the “costs” of divorce, which can be considered an extremely 
stressful life transition, impact chief decision makers and their firms’ performance.  
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In this paper, I study three divorce-related topics. First, I aim to test how CEO divorce 
events affect firms’ performance. The results present that divorced firms behave worse than 
matched firms before the divorce year and the DID coefficient 𝛽2 is positive following the divorce 
year, as divorced CEOs have completely released from divorce and can re-devote every effort to 
their work. 
Second, I test the compensation changes around the divorce year. As divorce cases result 
in the loss of CEOs’ personal wealth, the shareholders should modify managers’ incentive 
portfolios as soon as possible. The boards increase the incentives for divorced CEOs, and 
shareholders use equity-based compensation as a valuable method to incentivize divorced CEOs. 
The stock grants are significantly higher one year and two years post-divorce, which suggest that 
stock grants are strongly preferred as the incentive method. 
Third, I discuss the correlation between a divorce event and a CEO’s risk tolerance. 
Although shareholders increase equity-based compensation to enhance CEOs’ exposure to firm 
risk, our results show that firms with CEOs who have undergone divorces have lower volatility 
than their non-divorced counterparties. The firm risks are lower in the divorce year and one and 
two years after the divorce. In particular, the coefficient two years post-divorce is significantly 
strong at the 95% level for return volatility and 90% for idiosyncratic volatility. This may be 
explained by the less-diversified divorce managers who sell stocks and exercise options to pay for 
their spouses are more risk averse. 
Overall, this paper demonstrates a general framework for valuing the effect of CEOs’ 
divorces on their firms’ performance. Because there is little evidence in the press, this is an attempt 

















Adams, R.B., Almeida, H. and Ferreira, D., 2005. Powerful CEOs and their impact on corporate 
performance. Review of Financial Studies, 18(4), pp.1403-1432. 
Aggarwal, R.K. and Samwick, A.A., 1999. Executive compensation, strategic competition, and 
relative performance evaluation: Theory and evidence. Journal of Finance, 54(6), pp. 1999-
2043. 
Aretz, K., Bartram, S.M. and Pope, P.F., 2005. Macroeconomic risks and the Fama and 
French/Carhart model. In EFA 2005 Moscow Meeting. 
Barber, B.M. and Odean, T., 2000. Trading is hazardous to your wealth: The common stock 
investment performance of individual investors. Journal of Finance, 55(2), pp.773-806. 
Barkema, H.G. and Gomez-Mejia, L.R., 1998. Managerial compensation and firm performance: A 
general research framework. Academy of Management Journal, 41(2), pp.135-145. 
Bauer, R., Guenster, N. and Otten, R., 2004. Empirical evidence on corporate governance in Europe: 
The effect on stock returns, firm value and performance. Journal of Asset Management, 
5(2), pp.91-104. 
Boehme, R.D., Danielsen, B.R., Kumar, P. and Sorescu, S.M., 2009. Idiosyncratic risk and the 
cross-section of stock returns: Merton (1987) meets Miller (1977). Journal of Financial 
Markets, 12(3), pp.438-468. 
Boschen, J.F. and Smith, K.J., 1995. You can pay me now and you can pay me later: The dynamic 
response of executive compensation to firm performance. Journal of Business, 68(4), 
pp.577-608. 
Brick, I.E., Palmon, O. and Wald, J.K., 2006. CEO compensation, director compensation, and firm 
performance: Evidence of cronyism?. Journal of Corporate Finance, 12(3), pp.403-423. 
Brown, G. and Kapadia, N., 2007. Firm-specific risk and equity market development. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 84(2), pp.358-388. 
Cain, M.D. and McKeon, S.B., 2016. CEO personal risk-taking and corporate policies. Journal of 
Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 51(01), pp.139-164. 
Coles, J.L., Daniel, N.D. and Naveen, L., 2006. Managerial incentives and risk-taking. Journal of 
financial Economics, 79(2), pp.431-468. 
Cooper, M.J., Gulen, H. and Ovtchinnikov, A.V., 2010. Corporate political contributions and stock 
returns. Journal of Finance, 65(2), pp.687-724. 
  
27 
Core, J. and Guay, W., 1999. The use of equity grants to manage optimal equity incentive levels. 
Journal of Accounting and Economics, 28(2), pp.151-184. 
DeFusco, R.A., Johnson, R.R. and Zorn, T.S., 1990. The effect of executive stock option plans on 
stockholders and bondholders. Journal of Finance, 45(2), pp.617-627. 
Dittmann, I., Maug, E. and Spalt, O., 2007. Executive stock options when managers are loss averse. 
Working paper, University of Mannheim. 
Edmans, A. and Gabaix, X., 2011. The effect of risk on the CEO market. Review of Financial 
Studies, 24(8), pp.2822-2863. 
Faccio, M., Marchica, M.T. and Mura, R., 2016. CEO gender, corporate risk-taking, and the 
efficiency of capital allocation. Journal of Corporate Finance, 39(8), pp.193-209. 
Fama, E.F. and French, K.R., 2012. Size, value, and momentum in international stock returns. 
Journal of Financial Economics, 105(3), pp.457-472. 
Finkelstein, S., Hambrick, D.C. and Cannella, A.A., 2009. Strategic leadership: Theory and 
research on executives, top management teams, and boards. Oxford University Press, USA. 
Finkelstein, S. and Boyd, B.K., 1998. How much does the CEO matter? The role of managerial 
discretion in the setting of CEO compensation. Academy of Management Journal, 41(2), 
pp.179-199. 
Fisman, R.J., Khurana, R., Rhodes-Kropf, M. and Yim, S., 2013. Governance and CEO turnover: 
Do something or do the right thing?. Management Science, 60(2), pp.319-337. 
Gormley, T.A., Matsa, D.A. and Milbourn, T., 2013. CEO compensation and corporate risk: 
Evidence from a natural experiment. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 56(2), pp.79-
101. 
Gormley, T.A., Matsa, D.A. and Milbourn, T., 2013. CEO compensation and corporate risk: 
Evidence from a natural experiment. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 56(2), pp.79-
101. 
Guay, W.R., 1999. The sensitivity of CEO wealth to equity risk: An analysis of the magnitude and 
determinants. Journal of Financial Economics, 53(1), pp.43-71. 
Hadlock, C.J. and Lumer, G.B., 1997. Compensation, turnover, and top management incentives: 
Historical evidence. Journal of Business, 70(2), pp.153-187. 
Hall, B.J. and Murphy, K.J., 2002. Stock options for undiversified executives. Journal of 
Accounting and Economics, 33(1), pp.3-42. 
  
28 
Hansen, M.T., Ibarra, H. and Peyer, U., 2013. The best-performing CEOs in the world. Harvard 
Business Review, 91(1), pp.81-95.  
Barkema, H.G. and Gomez-Mejia, L.R., 1998. Managerial compensation and firm performance: A 
general research framework. Academy of Management journal, 41(2), pp.135-145. 
Haubrich, J.G., 1994. Risk aversion, performance pay, and the principal-agent problem. Journal of 
Political Economy, 102(2), pp.258-276. 
Hirshleifer, D. and Suh, Y., 1992. Risk, managerial effort, and project choice. Journal of Financial 
Intermediation, 2(3), pp.308-345. 
Holmstrom, B. and Milgrom, P., 1991. Multitask principal-agent analyses: Incentive contracts, 
asset ownership, and job design. Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, Vol. 7, 
Special Issue: [Papers from the Conference on the New Science of Organization, January 
1991],  pp.24-52. 
Holthausen, R.W., Larcker, D.F. and Sloan, R.G., 1995. Annual bonus schemes and the 
manipulation of earnings. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 19(1), pp.29-74. 
Hubbard, R.G. and Palia, D., 1995. Executive pay and performance evidence from the US banking 
industry. Journal of Financial Economics, 39(1), pp.105-130. 
Jensen, M.C., 1993. The modern industrial revolution, exit, and the failure of internal control 
systems. Journal of Finance, 48(3), pp.831-880. 
Klotz, J., 1963. Small sample power and efficiency for the one sample Wilcoxon and normal scores 
tests. Annals of Mathematical Statistics, 34(2), pp.624-632. 
Lambert, R.A., Larcker, D.F. and Verrecchia, R.E., 1991. Portfolio considerations in valuing 
executive compensation. Journal of Accounting Research, 29(1), pp.129-149. 
Malmendier, U., Tate, G. and Yan, J., 2011. Overconfidence and early‐life experiences: The 
effect of managerial traits on corporate financial policies. Journal of Finance, 66(5), 
pp.1687-1733. 
Mehran, H. (1995). Executive compensation structure, ownership, and firm performance. Journal 
of Financial Economics, 38(2), pp.163-184. 
Miller, D. and Dröge, C., 1986. Psychological and traditional determinants of structure. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 31(4), pp.539-560. 
Miller, J.S., Wiseman, R.M. and Gomez-Mejia, L.R., 2002. The fit between CEO compensation 
design and firm risk. Academy of Management Journal, 45(4), pp.745-756. 
  
29 
Murphy, K.J., 1999. Executive compensation. Handbook of Labor Economics, 3(B), pp.2485-2563. 
Neyland, J.B., 2011. Wealth shocks and executive compensation: Evidence from CEO divorce.   
Working paper, University of Arizona. 
Pathan, S., 2009. Strong boards, CEO power and bank risk-taking. Journal of Banking & Finance, 
33(7), pp.1340-1350. 
Rogers, D.A., 2002. Does executive portfolio structure affect risk management? CEO risk-taking 
incentives and corporate derivatives usage. Journal of Banking & Finance, 26(2), pp.271-
295. 
Roussanov, N. and Savor, P., 2014. Marriage and managers' attitudes to risk. Management Science, 
60(10), pp.2496-2508. 
Sanders, W.G. and Hambrick, D.C., 2007. Swinging for the fences: The effects of CEO stock 
options on company risk taking and performance. Academy of Management Journal, 50(5), 
pp.1055-1078. 
Simon, H.A., 1965. Administrative behavior: A study of decision-making processes in 
            administrative organizations. Free Press, USA. 
Smith, C.W. and Watts, R.L., 1982. Incentive and tax effects of executive compensation plans. 
Australian Journal of Management, 7(2), pp.139-157. 
Smith, C.W. and Watts, R.L., 1992. The investment opportunity set and corporate financing, 
dividend, and compensation policies. Journal of financial Economics, 32(3), pp.263-292. 
Tufano, P., 1996. Who manages risk? An empirical examination of risk management practices in 
the gold mining industry. Journal of Finance, 51(4), pp.1097-1137. 
Virany, B., Tushman, M.L. and Romanelli, E., 1992. Executive succession and organization 
outcomes in turbulent environments: An organization learning approach. Organization 
Science, 3(1), pp.72-91. 
Weisbach, M.S., 1995. CEO turnover and the firm's investment decisions. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 37(2), pp.159-188. 
Westphal, J.D. and Zajac, E.J., 1993, August. Substance and symbolism in CEOs' long-term 
incentive plans. Administrative Science Quarterly, 39(3), pp.232-236.  
Williams, M.A. and Rao, R.P., 2006. CEO stock options and equity risk incentives. Journal of 
Business Finance & Accounting, 33(1‐2), pp.26-44. 
  
30 
Yermack, D., 1995. Do corporations award CEO stock options effectively? Journal of Financial 
Economics, 39(2), pp.237-269. 
Yermack, D., 1996. Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors. Journal 
of Financial Economics, 40(2), pp.185-211. 
Yim, S., 2013. The acquisitiveness of youth: CEO age and acquisition behavior. Journal of 































Table 1 Variable definitions 
Variable’s name Data source Description 
1y after  
 
 Dummy variable which equals to 
one if the year is one year after 
divorce. 
1y before   Dummy variable which equals to 
one if the year is one year before 
divorce. 
2y after   Dummy variable which equals to 
one if the year is two-year after 
divorce. 
Age Execucomp CEO’s age. 
Bonus  Execucomp The value of bonus each year paid to 
CEO 
Cash ratio Compustat Cash divided by total assets. 
Dividends dummy  Dividends indicator equals one if the 
firm pay dividends in that year. 
Divorce  An indicator which equals to one if 
the firm has divorce cases. 
Divorce year  Dummy variable which equals to 
one if the firm has divorce case. 
Exercisable options 
number 
Execucomp The number of CEO’s unexercised 
exercisable options. 
Exercisable options value Execucomp The value of CEO’s unexercised 
exercisable options. 
Idiosyncratic volatility CRSP The standard deviation of errors 
from four factor Carhart model.  
Leverage ratio Compustat Total debt divided by total equity, 
where total debt equals current 
liabilities plus long-term debt). 
Log assets Compustat Log of total assets. 
Log stock return volatility CRSP The standard deviation of 
annualized log returns. 
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Market capitalization Compustat Market capitalization is calculated 
by timing the firm’s shares 
outstanding by market price. 
Market to book ratio Compustat Market to book ratio is the ratio of 
firm’s market value divided by 
assets’ book value. 
Options grants  Excucomp The Black-Scholes values of options 
that managers gain. 
Other compensation Excucomp The value of other compensation 
paid to CEO 
PostDivorce  PostDivorce is a dummy variable 
equals to one for years t+1, t+2, t+3 
and zero otherwise. 
PreDivorce  PreDivorce is a dummy variable 
equals to one for years t-3, t-2, t-1 
and zero otherwise.   
Restricted stock number Excucomp The number of restricted stock. 
Restricted stock value Excucomp The value of restricted stock. 
Return on assets Compustat EBIT divided by total assets. 
Return on equity Compustat EBIT divided by common stock. 
Salary Excucomp The value of salary paid to CEO. 
Share owned Excucomp The number of shares owned by 
CEO 
Stock grants  Excucomp The annual restricted stock grants 
paid to CEOs. 















Table 2 List of abbreviations 
Abbreviations   
CEO Chief executive officer 
DID Difference-in-difference estimations 
MC Market capitalization 
MTB Market-to-book ratio 
PSM Propensity score matching 
ROA Return on assets 
ROE Return on equity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
